The code runs as a standard Linux process. Seccomp acts as a strict allowlist filter, reducing the set of permitted system calls. However, any allowed syscall still executes directly against the shared host kernel. Once a syscall is permitted, the kernel code processing that request is the exact same code used by the host and every other container. The failure mode here is that a vulnerability in an allowed syscall lets the code compromise the host kernel, bypassing the namespace boundaries.
it seems like a little more automation could make an ATM part of the system.
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